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Civil Procedure
By JOHN R. LEATHERS
INTRODUCTION
The past Kentucky appellate court term, which is the subject
of this Survey, was an unusually interesting one for several reasons.
First, an unusually high number of cases fell within this subject
matter area. Second, some of the cases concern subjects seldom
addressed at the appellate level and thus furnish an unusual degree
of guidance. Additionally, the Kentucky Supreme Court seems
to have produced a higher volume of opinions than had been the
case in the recent past. With all the changes recently in the member-
ship of that Court, it can only be hoped that this is a trend that
will continue.
As has been the case in past Surveys, the practitioner is cau-
tioned not to rely upon this Survey as an exhaustive treatment
of the appellate decisions of the past year.' The sheer number
of opinions rendered has necessitated a culling process to choose
the cases described herein. This process will, of necessity, reflect
my own personal judgment as to what is interesting and worthy
of comment.
In the cases of the past term, Kentucky has remained very
much in the mainstream with its interpretations of the Civil Rules,
keeping close to interpretations made of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The decisions continue to rely on federal authority
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. J.D. 1971, University of New Mex-
ico; LL.M. 1973, Columbia University. Since the writing of this Article, Professor Leathers
has entered practice with the Lexington law firm of Shuffett, Mooney, McCoy, Campbell,
Leathers & Newcomer.
Other cases of the Survey period (roughly including July, 1982 through July, 1983),
not discussed herein, include: Stovall v. Ford, 30 Ky. L. SuMM. 14, at 9 (Ky. Nov. 23,
1983) [hereinafter cited as KLS], aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 29 KLS 11, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App.
Sept. 9, 1982) (Supreme Court found fraud was seasonably pled in a response to motion for
summary judgment; Davis v. Home Indem. Co., 659 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1983) (KY. R. Civ.
P. 60.02, 60.05 [hereinafter cited as CR] correction of judgment); Bartley v. Loyall, 648
S.W.2d 873 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (challenges to sufficiency of evidence and to the jury selec-
tion process); Cloverleaf Dairy v. Michaels, 636 S.W.2d 894 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (CR 59.05,
73.02, concerning the running of time for appeal); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Weartz, 636 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (CR 75.01, designation of the record question).
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and commentaries, although I have not observed in these cases
the marked preference for Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and
Procedure over Moore's Federal Practice, which I have previously
described.2 Nevertheless, Wright & Miller remains my personal
choice because of ease of use. With these caveats in mind, I will
return to a discussion of the various noteworthy cases of this term.
I. DISCOVERY
While the discovery rules remain the central and most strik-
ing feature of the civil procedure system established by the Ken-
tucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)3 and the Federal Rules,4 case
law interpreting those rules in both the federal and state systems
is relatively scarce. This is due to the existence of Rules requiring
the existence of a "final judgment" as a predicate to ordinary
appellate review in both the state system' and the federal system."
The requirement of a final judgment is, therefore, a major obstacle
in the appellate review of discovery actions, since such decisions
are interlocutory in nature.7 A further obstacle to review comes
from the refusal of appellate courts to consider procedural mat-
ters which may constitute "harmless error." 8
Given the dual hurdle of awaiting final judgment and then
tracing harmful error back to some matter in the discovery pro-
cess which may have occurred years before, it should not be sur-
prising that published discovery opinions are scarce. In the federal
system, the problem is not as difficult, since a fair number of
federal district court opinions are published in the Federal Sup-
' See Leathers, Kentucky Law Survey-Civil Procedure, 71 Ky. L.J. 395 (1982-83);
Leathers, Tomasi & Hunt, Kentucky Law Survey-Civil Procedure. 70 KY. L.J. 551
(1981-82).
' CR 26.01-37.05 contain the Kentucky discovery rules.
' In the federal system, the discovery rules may be found in FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37
[hereinafter cited as FRCP].
I See In re Gill, 17 S.W. 166 (Ky. 1891); Weddington v. Sloan, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.)
119 (1854). Both cases involved a writ of habeas corpus. In each case, the Kentucky Court
of Appeals determined that its jurisdiction extended only to final orders and judgments
of inferior courts, unless an appeal is expressly allowed by statute.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
See Claussner Hosiery Co. v. Paducah, 120 S.W.2d 1039 (Ky. 1938) (issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum was not a final order of the court, and hence not subject to appeal).
' See Davidson v. Moore, 340 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1960); FRCP 61; CR 61.01.
[Vol. 72
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plement. Thus it is possible, in federal practice, to get a feel for
the interpretation of discovery rules from trial level opinions.
However, no such feature is available in Kentucky state practice.
Due to the final judgment requirement, 9 the harmless error rule"°
and the lack of published trial court opinions-predicting discovery
interpretations in Kentucky is almost impossible, other than by
relying on personal experience and observation. In view of such
scarcity, it is of great significance that this past term had three
appellate cases" dealing with the discovery process.
The practical bars to Kentucky appellate review'" show that ap-
pellate cases dealing with discovery must have arisen in some ex-
traordinary procedural setting. Indeed, two of the cases during this
Survey period arose from an attempt to secure a writ of prohibi-
tion preventing a circuit judge from allowing certain discovery.'3
The discovery section of the third decision is a virtually gratuitous
aside in an appeal in which an evidentiary point was pivotal.'
Although in theory extraordinary writs (prohibition and man-
damus) exist to secure appellate directions either to stop or to com-
pel discovery,' 5 reading too much into the two cases would be a
mistake. I do not think either case signals that the appellate courts
are ready to begin active supervision of discovery. Such would be
too burdensome, given the obvious magnitude of discovery. Rather,
both cases rise to the appellate level due to the compelling nature
of the facts.
In Triple Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Anderson,'6a writ of prohibi-
tion was issued.' 7 Questions had been asked in the deposition of
a coal company employee which would have required disclosure
of the wheelage rate paid by the company under contracts with non-
' See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
10 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
I Triple Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Anderson, 646 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1983); Alexander
v. Swearer, 642 S.W.2d 896 (Ky. 1983); Big Sandy Wholesale, Inc. v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d
778 (Ky. 1982).
2 See notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text.
See Triple Elkhorn Mining Co. v. Anderson, 646 S.W.2d at 725; Big Sandy
Wholesale, Inc. v. Conley, 639 S.W.2d at 778.
See Alexander v. Swearer, 642 S.W.2d at 896.
" Such relief is available at the appellate level under the provisions of CR 76.36.
646 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1983).
17 Id.
1983-841
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parties. Prior Kentucky cases had held, in actions against coal com-
panies for damages caused by trespass, that the measure of such
damages was controlled by diminution in rental or market value,
rather than by wheelage or tonnage rates.'" Thus, the wheelage or
tonnage rates of deponent's employer were not relevant to the pro-
ceeding under Kentucky law.
Review of the decision ordering the deponent to answer by peti-
tion for a writ of prohibition is very much akin to an ordinary trial-
level decision upon a motion for a protective order. Thus, case law
interpreting the availability of a protective order for such infor-
mation should be relevant in this decision. In portion, the rule
relating to protective orders provides "commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way".' 9 Although
a great deal has been written about how to apportion the burden
of proof when one party desires access to another's commercial
information, 20 "[n]o one would suggest that discovery should be
allowed of information that has no conceivable bearing on the
case." 21 The information sought in Anderson did not have any
conceivable bearing on the case. Thus, it did not meet the threshold
discovery requirement of relevance, and hence, was clearly subject
to the protection ordered. The pressing importance of seeking im-
mediate appellate review was the fact that the desired information,
of obvious importance to competitors, would have become part
of the public record once disclosed. Any damage caused by the
disclosure would not have been remediable. That unique and com-
pelling harm, coupled with the clear Kentucy position that discovery
" See Texaco Inc. v. Melton, 463 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1971); Kentucky Mountain Coal
Co. v. Hacker, 412 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1967).
CR 26.03(1)(g).
20 See, e.g., 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2043
(1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. This treatise states:
It is for the party resisting discovery to establish, in the first instance, that
the information sought is within this provision of the rule and that he might be
harmed by its disclosure....
If it is established that confidential information is being sought, the burden
is on the party seeking discovery to establish that the information is sufficiently
relevant and necessary to his case to outweigh the harm disclosure would cause
to the person from whom he is seeking the information.
11 Id. at § 2008.
[Vol. 72
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ought not to have been ordered by the trial court22 explains the
granting of the extraordinary relief by way of a writ of prohibition.
Similarly compelling facts were present in Big Sandy Wholesale,
Inc. v. Conley,"3 where the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to
issue a writ of prohibition.24 In that case, the plaintiff attempted
to get a copy of a written report prepared for the defendant by
a company providing services as an expert in seeking the cause of
an automobile accident. 21 Since the work in question was done by
an expert in anticipation of litigation, that expert's work product
fell within the qualified protections of CR 26.02. Since the defen-
dant did not expect to call this expert as a witness at trial, facts
or opinions known to that expert could only be discovered by a
showing of "exceptional circumstances." 26 In Big Sandy, the vehi-
cle in question had been disassembled, and the part (left wheel
assembly) suspected of causing the accident had been sent away
for expert evaluation.27 The expert who examined the wheel
assembly furnished a report to the defendant. The defendant
wanted discovery of the report prohibited on the basis that the ex-
pert was readily available for deposition by the plaintiff at the ex-
pert's place of business in Ohio at a cost of $1,000.28 The Supreme
Court agreed with the trial judge that these facts constituted "ex-
ceptional circumstances" and ordered disclosure of the report.
2 9
Given the facts, the result in Big Sandy seems quite correct.
Indeed, the result is quite similar to one reached in a Kentucky
federal trial court, which ordered disclosure of a report contain-
ing information which could not then have been duplicated by the
12 646 S.W.2d at 726.
2 639 S.W.2d at 778 (Ky. 1982).
Id. at 780.
" Id. at 778-79.
26 CR 26.02(4)(b) provides:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who
has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35.02 or upon a showing of excep-
tional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking
discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the subject by other means.
Rule 35.02, which applies only to reports of examining physicians, is not relevant here.
27 639 S.W.2d at 779.
28 Id. at 780.
29 Id. at 779-80.
1983-84]
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party seeking discovery.3" In similar federal decisions from other
states, discovery has been ordered when an item had been substan-
tially altered and was no longer available for examination.3' In a
case even more similar to Big Sandy, discovery was ordered where
an automobile had been disassembled. 32 In view of these cases,
situations where alternate sources are impossible to secure, or where
the cost is prohibitive, disclosure is appropriate.
While the result in Big Sandy is quite correct both the trial court
and the Supreme Court apparently failed to notice that, "unless
manifest injustice would result," the court "shall require the par-
ty seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the
fees and expenses reasonably incurred.., in obtaining facts and
opinions from the expert." ' 33 It appears, however, that the plain-
tiff secured the copy of the expert's report at no cost. Given that
the defendant was not going to use the expert at trial,34 it seems
only fair that the plaintiff pay some portion of the cost of secur-
ing that report, since plaintiff will be the one to benefit. Since the
plaintiff in Big Sandy would have had to pay $1,000 to get the in-
formation by deposition in Ohio,35 it does not seem unreasonable
to ask that he bear some of the expense in getting the document.
The order of discovery was correct, but allowing one party a free
ride is a serious error. The possibility of a "free ride" in discovery
has been a nagging problem since the Federal Rules were adopted,
but the problem can be obviated in large part by a strict adherence
to the rules concerning imposition of costs.
" See Sanford Constr. Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 465
(E.D. Ky. 1968). In Sanford, a construction firm brought a breach of warranty action against
a manufacturer following the collapse of an aluminum sewer pipe. Since none of the defen-
dant's agents were present at excavation of the pipe and backfill, information contained in
plaintiff's expert's reports could not be obtained by defendant's independent investigation.
The court required production of the expert's reports under FRCP 34 which covers the pro-
duction of documents and things, and not FRCP 26, the federal counterpart of CR 26. Id.
at 466-67.
"' See, e.g., Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376, 379 (D.N.J. 1954) (expert's
report, compiled immediately after the explosion of a gas stove, was discoverable under FRCP
34 because the stove was subsequently dismantled and certain parts removed).
11 Colden v. R.J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521, 522 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (since the
car had been dismantled, the court, relying on FRCP 34, concluded that the party seeking
discovery could not obtain the information requested through independent investigation).
33 CR 26.04(4)(c).
14 639 S.W.2d at 780.
35 Id.
[Vol. 72
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The problem of disclosure of reports during the discovery pro-
cess was also addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Alex-
ander v. Swearer.3" In that case, the defendant was ordered to turn
over a copy of a report of an investigator concerning the accident.
37
Although the case does not explicitly say so, I assume that the
report was done by an insurance claims adjuster, or an investigator
for defendant's liability insurer. I base that assumption on the fact
that the defendant rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle and the report in
question contained such phrases as "this looks like an open and
shut case," "several things bother me," "this is probably the rea-
son," and "it is possible that the driver.
' ' 3
1
What troubled the Supreme Court about the disclosure of an
investigative report containing phrases like those mentioned above
is that they rather obviously represent the "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions or legal theories ' 3 of the person writing the
report, disclosure of which is forbidden by the rules.4" Like the
report of the expert witness in Big Sandy, the work in question here
was triai preparation material4 and as such was within the qualified
protection of CR 26.02(3). "2 The difference between this case and
Big Sandy is that Alexander did not involve preparation by an ex-
pert witness, which is subject to the separate protections of CR
26.02(4).
The protection of trial preparation materials has been an
especially sensitive issue since the adoption of the current rules in
the federal system. The so-called "work product" protection, now
36 642 S.W.2d 896 (Ky. 1983).
"7 Id. at 898.
38 Id.
39 CR 26.02(3Xa).
,0 Id. CR 26.02(3)(a) states in part: "[A] party may obtain discovery... [of matters]
prepared in anticipation of litigation . . . only upon a showing . . . [of] substantial need
. . and that he is unable without undue hardship" to secure the materials or their equivalent
elsewhere.
" 642 S.W.2d at 898.
CR 26.02(3)(a) states:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable.., and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by some other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure.
1983-84]
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codified in the rules,43 has its origin in the United States Supreme
Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor." In that opinion, the Court
paid special attention to inquiries into the mental state and thoughts
of opposing counsel, worrying that discovery of such would thrust
an attorney into the inappropriate role of a witness.45 A concurr-
ing opinion expressed doubts that such disclosures could ever be
justified. 6
The debate surrounding this specialized area of "opinion work
product" centers on two aspects: (1) whether the protection ap-
plies to non-attorneys (the focus of Hickman);47 and (2) whether
the protection is absolute. As regards the breadth of work product,
the question seems easily settled by the plain language of the cur-
rent rule that includes "an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation. ' 48 The case law indicates that "opi-
nion work product immunity applies equally to lawyers and non-
lawyers alike." '4 9 Indeed, the breadth of the work product excep-
tion may be sufficient to allow a party to refuse to answer ques-
tions which might reflect the impressions of his attorney as to what
are the strong and weak points of the case.
50
The harder question is determining whether such protection is
absolute. As has been noted previously, the Supreme Court in
Hickman seems to have believed that the immunity was qualified,5'
while Justice Jackson found the protection absolute. 2 Since that
time, some federal case law has found the immunity absolute, 3
4 FRCP 26.
.4 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
" Id. at 512-13.
46 Id. at 519 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson noted that "nothing in the tradi-
tion or practice of discovery up to the time of these Rules would have suggested that they
would authorize such a practice as here proposed." Id.
4 In Hickman, plaintiff requested from the defendants copies of any statements of
crew members taken in connection with the accident. 329 U.S. at 495.
41 "In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation."
CR 26.02(3)(a).
41 See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1976).
'o See 8 WRIGHT & MhuteR, supra note 20, at § 2026.
" 329 U.S. at 512-13.
2 Id. at 519 (Jackson, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1974).
[Vol. 72
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but the United States Supreme Court has recently indicated that
it was "not prepared at this juncture to say that such material is
always protected." 5' 4 Some courts that normally consider work pro-
duct to be protected seem to create exceptions for crime or fraud
and when the mental impressions and theories of a party's attorney
are at issue.5 5 There is no Kentucky case law to indicate whether
we would adopt that qualified position, and I would not even ven-
ture a guess as to how that issue will go.
The Kentucky position appears to be that opinion work pro-
duct is not absolutely protected. In Alexander, Chief Justice
Stephens noted that the trial court had not required the party seek-
ing discovery to demonstrate hardship, a requirement he
characterized as "unambiguous and mandatory. ' 56 In reaching its
decision, the Court seems to imply that hardship might justify the
disclosure of opinion work product.57 This may provide a clue that
Kentucky courts will not adopt the position of absolute protection
for opinion work product. If, indeed, only a qualified protection
is to be adopted, then the courts must carefully proceed in deter-
mining what facts might justify such disclosure. The inherent abuse
and harm of disclosure is always going to be present. As a pro-
tection, a strong "showing of necessity and unavailability by other
means" should be required before disclosure is compelled.58 Thus,
the showing of hardship necessary to pierce the normal work pro-
duct protection would be increased substantially for opinion work
product. This is the result which should eventually be reached.
II. LONG ARM JURISDICTION
Although Kentucky has a very broad long arm statute, and
borders with several states at major metropolitan areas, the state
has had surprisingly few long arm jurisdictional cases. As has been
' Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981) (The Court determined that
the government's showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent infor-
mation without undue hardship was not sufficient to require disclosure of notes and memoran-
da based on oral statements, but the Court declined to impose an absolute immunity). Id.
" Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 64 VA. L. REv. 333, 341 (1978).
,1 Alexander v. Swearer, 642 S.W.2d at 898.
57 Id.
" Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. at 402.
1983-84]
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stated in an earlier article, Kentucky has not rethought its jurisdic-
tional and notice schemes in recent years despite major federal con-
stitutional developments. 9 In the recent case of First National Bank
of Louisville v. Shore Tire Co.,6" the court of appeals interpreted
the Kentucky long arm statute6' in a very interesting fact pattern.
In Shore Tire, the bank was the owner of some accounts receivable
which had originally belonged to IRI, a corporation with its prin-
cipal place of business in Kentucky.62 Defendants in the action were
various account debtors of IRI, and all were non-resident corpora-
tions without certificates to do business in Kentucky. In a series
of transactions over several years, the defendant debtors had pur-
chased tires from IRI on credit, which resulted in the accounts
which were the subject of the action.
63
In deciding whether the various defendants were subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Kentucky, the court of appeals noted that the
orders with IRI were the result of IRI salesmen soliciting these non-
resident defendants in their home states. 6" The contracts of pur-
chase arose either by mail or by phone. The points of origin of
the negotiations were not clear, but the orders were accepted in
Kentucky and tires were shipped from the state. 6 Despite the orders
being solicited out of state, the court of appeals found that the long
course of dealing in which the defendants had engaged was suffi-
cient to bring them within the "transacting business" portion of
the long arm statute,66 and that those contacts were sufficient to
satisfy the minimum contacts requirements of federal law. 67 Prior
11 See Leathers, Rethinking Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky, 71 Ky. L.J. 755
(1982-83).
60 651 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
61 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as KRS].
62 651 S.W.2d at 472-73.
63 Id. at 473.
64 Id. at 472
65 Id. at 473.
66 Id. KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982), provides for personal jurisdiction
over defendants "transacting any business in this commonwealth."
67 651 S.W.2d at 474. The necessity of satisfying federal standards stems from the
fact that impermissibly broad assertions of jurisdiction are violative of due process. Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-36 (1877). The due process determination is judged by the
"minimum contacts" standard set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945).
[Vol. 72
CrvL PROCEDURE
to reaching its conclusion that the defendants fell within Kentucky's
jurisdiction, the court engaged in a very interesting discussion of
the difference between asserting jurisdiction over a non-resident
seller (the more common case) and a non-resident buyer (the facts
in Shore Tire)."8
The dichotomy between non-resident sellers and non-resident
buyers is illustrated by the United States Supreme Court decision
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.69 In McGee, Califor-
nia was allowed to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident seller
of life insurance for a claim arising from what seemingly was the
only insurance contract issued by the company to a California
resident." Although one can find cases in which a non-resident
seller was not subjected to jurisdiction,7' it seems fairly clear that
a non-resident seller has, in its decision to solicit business in the
state, made more of a conscious undertaking to avail itself of that
state's law than a non-resident buyer. Attaching significance to that
distinction, many courts have refused to uphold jurisdiction over
non-resident buyers. 72
A prior Kentucky case, Tube Turns Division of Chemtron
Corp. v. Patterson Co. ,7 seemed to indicate that Kentucky would
take the position that non-resident buyers were not within the
jurisdiction of the Kentucky courts.7  Tube Turns was distinguished
factually in Shore Tire by observing that in Tube Turns only a
single purchase transaction was claimed as a basis for jurisdiction.75
In Shore Tire, the long continuing course of dealing between the
defendants and ICI was said to bring them clearly within the
jurisdiction of the Kentucky courts.76
The result in Shore Tire is certainly a possible interpretation.
In the decision, the court of appeals continues to assert that the
Kentucky long arm statute reaches the outer limits of due process, 77
6B 651 S.W.2d at 473.
-, 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
'0 Id. at 221-23.
" See, e.g., O'Brien v. Comstock Foods Inc., 194 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1963).
72 See, e.g., Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., 117 N.W.2d 732
(Minn. 1962).
73 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
74 Id. at 101.
11 651 S.W.2d at 474.
76 Id.
7 Id.
1983-84]
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an interpretation consistent with the declaration of a recent Sixth
Circuit case." I have disagreed previously with such an
interpretation,79 but such broad construction is unnecessary to reach
the final conclusion of Shore Tire. Even under the strict line of
due process interpretations favored by the United States Supreme
Court,8" there is no doubt that the long course of dealing engaged
in by the defendants with a Kentucky manufacturing facility made
it perfectly fair to subject them to a suit arising from those deal-
ings in a Kentucky forum. Still, I would conclude from the opin-
ion that more factual connections to the jurisdiction will be required
to assert jurisdiction over a buyer than would be required for a
seller.
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
It is quite interesting that, in a year when our appellate courts
had one of their relatively infrequent examinations of long arm
jurisdiction, there also arose a case invoking the somewhat related
doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine can only be in-
voked if a court determines it has jurisdiction, but should decline
to hear the case on the basis of equitable factors, thus leaving the
decision to be made in a "more convenient" forum.8 ' The doc-
trine of long arm jurisdiction, rooted as it is in the concept of due
process, also involves in part a weighing of the fairness and relative
convenience of exercising jurisdiction.
In the case of Allen v. Appalachian Regional Hospitals Inc.,8"
the court of appeals upheld a dismissal, by Judge Charles Tackett
of the Fayette Circuit Court, of a medical malpractice action on
the basis of forum non conveniens. That case presented no jurisdic-
tional problems, and Fayette County was a proper venue because
" Poyner v. Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980). Poyner held that,
under Kentucky's long arm statute, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over a Ger-
man based manufacturer of firearms and a New York distributor of firearms, where, in
a products liability action, a 16-year old Kentucky youth was injured by a bullet wound
inflicted by a semi-automatic pistol. Id. at 1192.
" See Leathers, supra note 59, at 772.
,0 See World Wide Volkswagen v. Wolfson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
" BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 589-90 (5th ed. 1979).
30 KLS 7, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App. June 6, 1983).
[Vol. 72
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it was the site of the principal office of one of the defendants.
Nevertheless, the action was dismissed due to the fact that the alleg-
ed malpractice occurred in Harlan County, and that county seemed
to be the most convenient place of trial for securing witnesses and
physical evidence.8 3
From the standpoint of the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
the Allen decision is not particularly exciting. Harlan County was
the situs of the alleged malpractice, the residence of the co-
defendant doctor and the location of another co-defendant medical
clinic.14 What is significant about the case is that it is the first time
that a Kentucky court has applied the doctrine in a case involving
two Kentucky counties, rather than Kentucky and a sister state.
In two earlier cases, Kentucky courts had directed the dismissal of
actions so that the cases might be tried in another state which was
considered a more convenient forum. 5 In a 1981 case, the court
of appeals impliedly approved usage of the doctrine in the intrastate
setting, 6 but the holding in Allen clearly establishes applicability
of the doctrine in the intrastate setting.
Although establishing the doctrine in an intrastate setting, the
facts in Allen do not provide much practical guidance as to when
a trial judge might exercise his discretion to invoke the concept.
This is also an area in which federal case law will be of little aid
to the practitioner. The last major federal forum non conveniens
case was Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 7 which was decided more than
thirty years ago. The doctrine now has almost no utility in the
federal system due to the passage by Congress of the transfer
statute," making it possible for a federal court having jurisdiction
and venue to transfer the case to another federal district court
Id. at 7.
" Id. at 6.
SS See Carter v. Netherton, 302 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1957); Williams v. Williams, 611
S.W.2d 807 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
" Humeldorf v. Humeldorf, 616 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). In this case Ken-
tucky's divorce venue statute, KRS 452.470 (1975) which fixes venue in the home county
of the wife, was held unconstitutional. The court said the following factors are relevant
in determining the county of venue in a divorce action: "(1) the county of the parties' marital
residence prior to separation; (2) the usual residence of the children, if any; (3) accessi-
bility of witnesses and the economy of offering proof." 616 S.W.2d at 798.
" 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976).
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which can more conveniently try the action. Although the case law
interpreting appropriate fact patterns for usage of transfer might
seem applicable by analogy for forum non conveiens determina-
tions under state law, caution is advised in making such analogy.
The transfer statute is clearly not a precise codification of forum
non conveniens. 9 Hence, transfer may be granted in cases that
would not justify a forum non conveniens dismissal.
Quite apart from the intrastate dimensions of the forum non
conveniens doctrine as now interpreted in Kentucky, it is interesting
to note that the doctrine is not nearly as ancient as one might sup-
pose. The seminal discussion of forum non conveniens (indeed,
some have thought that the article itself created the doctrine) is in
a law review article written more than fifty years ago. 90 In that
article, Professor Blair noted that, at that time, the doctrine was
applicable in less than half a dozen American jurisdictions. 9' The
concept itself comes from the philosophical position that "jurisdic-
tion may be refused where there are good reasons against assum-
ing it." 92 Those familiar with the doctrine may be surprised to learn
that it engendered a good bit of criticism as it related to interstate
cases. Some feared that the doctrine was being used to discriminate
against nonresidents, a usage which would be violative of the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the United States
Constitution.93 At the time of that critical appraisal, which was con-
temporaneous with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,94 the doctrine was
rejected by most states95 and accepted in only a half dozen, 96 just
" Among the possible differences which might be noted between the two concepts
is that under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 transfer is available at the motion of either plaintiff or defen-
dant. So far as can be determined, no action was ever dismissed upon forum non conve-
niens grounds at the request of a plaintiff. As has been observed in the leading treatise
on federal practice, "transfers under the statute may be granted under circumstances that
would not have justified a dismissal prior to the statute." 5 WRIGHT & MELLER, supra note
20, § 1352, at 574 (1972).
'0 Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens In Anglo-American Law, 29 CoL-
uM. L. Rav. 1 (1929).
" Cf. id.
92 21 C.J.S. Courts § 90, at 140 (1940).
Barrett, Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAnF. L. REv. 380, 389-93 (1947).
94 330 U.S. at 501.
9 Barrett, supra note 93, at 388 n.40.
96 Id. at 389 n.41. Those states which apparently had accepted the doctrine general-
ly at that time were: Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and
New York. Id.
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as Professor Blair had observed twenty years earlier.7 The Supreme
Court decision in Gilbert apparently triggered acceptance for the
doctrine. By 1960, it was noted that "the modern trend is toward
general acceptance of the rule of forum non conveniens in some
form." 98 By the time a further study was done of the acceptance
of the doctrine in 1971,9 it had carried the day. It was then being
applied in sixteen states, accepted in six others and seemingly ap-
proved in still five more (including Kentucky).'
Whatever the merits of the history of the concept, it is now
clearly established in Kentucky in both the interstate and intrastate
settings.'' Kentucky's application of forum non conveniens brings
the state into agreement with other jurisdictions.
IV. STAYS PENDING APPELLATE REvIEw
This past term included the case of Bella Garden Apartments,
Ltd. v. Johnson,12 in which the judgment of the Bell Circuit Court
included a mandatory injunction to plaintiff to vacate certain
premises. Seeking to delay the injunction pending appeal, plain-
tiff sought and was granted a stay by the court of appeals, pro-
vided plaintiff would furnish bond in the trial court. The stay was
granted ex parte, bond was furnished by plaintiff, and then defen-
dant sought to have the court of appeals set aside its ex parte
order.' 3 That court was willing to do so but thought it a fruitless
action since plaintiff had by that time furnished bond in the trial
court, which the court of appeals seems to have thought equivalent
to a supersedeas bond.0 4
All this activity centered upon a perception on the part of plain-
tiff's counsel, the trial judge and the court of appeals that the pro-
visions of CR 62.03(1),105 which allows supersedeas in an action
" See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
" Trautman, Forum Non Conveniens in Washington-A Dead Issue?, 35 WAsH L.
Ray. 88, 95 (1960) (quoting Leflar, THE LAW OF CoN~ucr oF LAws 88 (1959)).
" See Note, Forum Non Conveniens in Missouri History and Appraisal, 36 Mo. L.
R v. 105 (1971).
00 Id. at 106 n.8.
,0, See Allen v. Appalachian Regional Hosps. Inc., 30 KLS 7 at 6-7.
1 642 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1982).
,o Id. at 899-900.
I14 d. at 900.
"I' The title of the rule is quite indicative of its substantive provisions: "Pending ap-
peal of judgment other than injunction judgment." CR 62.03 (emphasis added).
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if bond is posted pursuant to CR 73.04.106 The plain fact of the
matter, as noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Bella Gardens,
is that the rule upon which all those parties were relying has nothing
whatsoever to do with securing interlocutory relief pending appeal
of a case granting injunctive relief.'1
7
The availability of interlocutory relief pending appeal of cases
involving injunctive relief is governed by CR 65.08.08 That this
rule is the exclusive source of such interlocutory relief is made clear
by CR 62.02. 09 What this means, quite simply, is that a party seek-
ing interlocutory relief pending appeal of a case involving an in-
junction, may obtain relief only from the court of appeals, which
has the power to "grant, suspend or modify" the injunctive relief
pending appeal."' To put the matter another way, it is impossi-
ble to supersedeas an action involving an injunction.
The inapplicability of supersedeas relief to injunctions is
something which has a long and clear history in Kentucky. Long
before the adoption of the Civil Rules, the practice code provid-
ed that parties suffering from injunctive relief could seek relief from
the Court of Appeals pending appeal."' What this means, as a
practical matter, is that relief from injunctions is not a matter of
right (as would be the suspension of a money judgment by the fur-
nishing of supersedeas bond), but rather is addressed to the
equitable jurisdiction of the appellate court. At least four Kentucky
appellate cases prior to Bella Gardens clearly state that supersedeas
is inapplicable to cases of injunctive relief."12 In the face of the clari-
"I6 See 642 S.W.2d at 900.
107 Id.
101 Again, the rule title gives indication of its contents: "Interlocutory relief pending
appeal from final judgment." CR 65.08.
"I "When an appeal is taken from any final judgment granting or denying injunc-
tive relief, the judgment may be stayed as provided in Rule 65.08." CR 62.02 (emphasis
added).
110 " 'After the record on appeal has been filed in the Court of Appeals .... any par-
ty may move the Court of Appeals to grant, suspend, or modify injunctive relief during
the pendency of the appeal . . . ." CR 65.08(3).
"' "Either party, within twenty days after the entry of such an order, may... move
the Court of Appeals... to revise the order of the lower court, and finally determine how
far the injunction shall be suspended, modified or continued pending the appeal." KN-
TUCKY CIVL CODE OF PRACTICE § 747 (Carroll 1919).
"I See Lexington Loose Leaf Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Coleman, 158 S.W.2d 633
(Ky. 1942); Cox v. Jones, 235 S.W. 365 (Ky. 1921); Stratton & Terstegge v. Mosely, 144
S.W. 1083 (Ky. 1912); Borrone v. Mosely, 137 S.W. 531 (Ky. 1911).
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ty of the rules and the cases interpreting the rules, one cannof but
think the rule is well settled.
V. SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS
While one might wish that any trial court adjudication, after
the expiration of the time for appeal, would be a final settlement
of the controversy, such is obviously not the case. Some cases never
seem to die no matter how many times they get decided. The pro-
cess of allowing a trial court to set aside its former judgments is
formalized in the current version of CR 60.02." 3 While it may serve
a salutary purpose to have such power available, policy demands
that exercise of the power be infrequent.
In the case of Morgan v. O'Neil,"4 the Kentucky Supreme
Court had occasion to interpret the rule as applied to a default
judgment obtained in Jefferson Circuit Court. Default judgments
are clearly disfavored by the law. That is the reason that "cases
calling for great liberality in granting Rule 60(b) motions [identical
to Kentucky CR 60.02], for the most part, have involved default
judgments."" I However, one should not forget that "[a] judgment
of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-
matter operates as res judicata, in the absence of fraud or collu-
sion, even if obtained upon a default. '"" 6 In attempting to balance
those conflicting policies, the Kentucky Supreme Court has in
Morgan rendered a decision which has far-reaching implications.
Morgan involved an attempt to enforce an Indiana judgment
against a stockholder of a Kentucky corporation." 7 Although the
judgment was against the corporation, the plaintiff asserted that
"' CR 60.02 states in part:
On motion, a court may. . . relieve a party . . . from its final judg-
ment... upon the following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) per-
jury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than per-
jury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, releas-
ed or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justi-
fying relief.
"4 652 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1983).
I' 11 WIGHT & MILER, supra note 20, § 2857, at 160.
26 Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 225 (1929).
652 S.W.2d at 85.
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O'Neil (alleged to have been the sole stockholder of the corpora-
tion) was personally liable for the debt because he had allowed the
corporation to proceed through dissolution procedures while having
knowledge of the debt owed plaintiffs."I8 O'Neil was named in-
dividually as a party defendant in an amended complaint, but he
filed no answer and made no appearance. Judgment was entered
against him by default, and he subsequently moved to set that aside
under CR 60.02.' " The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
judgment should be set aside on the grounds that the complaint
had failed to state a claim upon wich relief might be granted.' 20
Thus, Kentucky's position is that a default judgment must be sup-
ported by a complaint which states a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
In reaching the conclusion that the judgment should be set aside
for failure to state a claim, the Supreme Court has added a new
ground to those normally utilized in practice under CR 60.02. Now,
in addition to being an inquiry into such fundamental issues as
jurisdiction, notice, fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence,
the rule has been expanded to include a post-judgment inquiry into
the sufficiency of the pleadings. The effect of this change is multi-
plied by the fact that the pleading standard to which the Court held
the plaintiff for purposes of surviving a rule 60.02 motion clearly
appears to be more stringent than would have been applied had
the question arisen in the typical context of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.' 2
However, prior Kentucky case law indicates that it is more difficult
to attack a judgment under CR 60.02 than to have an action
dismissed for failure of the complaint to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.I" Thus, the Court's conclusion in Morgan
was incorrect.
"' Id. at 84.
2t9 At least that is what I have deduced. The majority says that he moved to set aside
the default, but cites no rule on point. The dissenting opinion says CR 60.02 was the pro-
cedural vehicle. Id. at 86 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 85.
2 See CR 12.02(f).
222 To survive an attack under CR 60.02, a complaint "need not possess the qualities
of immunity to attack by demurrer (or attack under CR 12.02(7) [sic]." Crowder v.
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 379 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Ky. 1964) (citing 30A Am. JuR.
JUDGMENTS § 213).
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Based upon my reading of the Kentucky case law relating to
pleading standards, I believe the complaint in Morgan contained
sufficient information to have survived a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that defen-
1dant let the corporation (of which he was alleged to be the sole
stockholder) be dissolved despite knowledge of the debt to plain-
tiff and that the defendant was therefore personally liable. 123 Under
the current pleading rules in Kentucky, "a pleading should no
longer be construed against the pleader."' 24 Not only should the
pleader be given the benefit of the doubt, but "a complaint will
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears to
a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim."
'' 25
Given the concession of the former Court of Appeals in judg-
ing the sufficiency of a complaint that "[i]t is conceivable that cir-
cumstances could arise under which an employer may become liable
for the murder of an employee,"'' 26 the allegation in Morgan that
a sole stockholder would be personally liable hardly seems beyond
the realm of legal possibility. Indeed, Kentucky law has recogniz-
ed various theories under which shareholders of a corporation may
become personally responsible for corporate debts.' 27 Given that
a "complaint need only give fair notice of a cause of action and
the relief sought,"1 2 the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant
was personally liable for a specified amount would seem sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plain-
tiff's complaint is at least as informative as those set forth as
models in the forms accompanying the rules.' 29 Therefore, I con-
clude that, at least prior to Morgan, a complaint such as the one
filed therein would have survived an attack at the pleading stage.
Two possible conclusions follow from Morgan: (1) the Supreme
Court has obliged the Kentucky trial courts to apply a stricter
652 S.W.2d at 85.
,' Ewell v. Central City, 340 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Ky. 1960).
12 Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 340 S.W.2d 456, 460 (Ky. 1960). See also Ingram v.
Ingram, 283 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1955); Spencer v. Woods, 282 S.W.2d 851 (Ky. 1955).
126 Johnson v. Thoni Oil Magic Benzol Gas Stations Inc., 467 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ky.
1971).
27 See, e.g., Steele v. Stankey, 35 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1931).
121 See Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Ky. 1968)(quoting from CR 8.01).
29 See CR Appendix of Official Forms, forms 1-13.
1983-84]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
standard for pleadings in ruling on a motion to set aside a judg-
ment; or (2) the stricter pleading requirement found in Morgan is
applicable both in reviewing a pleading in the initial stages of a
suit and in reviewing a motion to set aside a judgment. It really
makes no difference which is true because either one will have ex-
actly the same negative effect on the pleading system.
Any procedural system must be internally consistent in order
to function smoothly. No system can run faster than the speed
which is available at its narrowest point. Detailed code pleading
was abandoned long ago for policy reasons. Yet a possible effect
of Morgan is to resurrect that old system. Having relaxed pleading
rules is not helpful if judgments may be set aside for a failure to
comply with strict pleading rules. No prudent attorney can now
afford to be sparse with his pleading in the filing of a suit because
he has no way of knowing at what long-advanced point that paucity
of pleading may return to haunt him. Indeed, given that there is
no indication that Morgan is limited to defaults, there is no reason
to think it inapplicable to any judgment. Thus the prudent attorney
should plead artfully, whether the test at motion to dismiss remains
the same or is modified. Since the system will apparently narrow
down to strict pleading at the time of motions under CR 60.02,
that requirement will slow down the system all the way to the initial
filing of a complaint and possibly alter behavior throughout.
Perhaps, the point is most colorfully made in the dissent by Judge
Leibson: "The majority opinion in this case is the tail wagging the
dog. In my view neither the tail nor the dog will hunt. I predict
much mischief will result from permitting this type of attack on
the finality of judgments." '' 30 I agree completely and think the ma-
jority has thrust upon us a great potential for problems. The Court
has impaired the finality of judgments and undermined a pleading
system which has been long and carefully developed.
CONCLUSION
In all of this, I have made some attempt to set forth what
I view to be the most significant procedural developments during
the past year. -While I have disagreed in some respects with some
,Mo 652 S.W.2d at 86-87 (Leibson, J., dissenting).
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of the decisions, I suppose that is to be expected from an academic
commentator. Despite that, I believe the year was unusually good
in that case law was developed on matters previously unaddressed.
While it may be a case of three steps forward and one step back,
still I think, on the whole, that progress is being made in the right
direction. A bit more attention to the letter of the rules and a
bit more thought as to the consequences in areas that at first glance
appear unrelated will bring further advance. I look forward
hopefully to that time.

